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The Settlement of Investment Disputes:
A Discussion of Democratic
Accountability and the Public Interest
LISE JOHNSON AND BROOKE SKARTVEDT GUVEN – March 13, 2017

A significant percentage of investor–state dispute settlement (ISDS) claims
are reportedly settled between the parties to the dispute before an award is
issued. By one count, 26 per cent of investment disputes concluded as of
December 31, 2015 (444 cases) were settled.[1] This number is almost

certainly an underestimate: it does not capture the settlement of disputes that
are not publicly known, and does not reflect any settlements negotiated prior
to the filing of an ISDS claim.
Settlements can be seen as positive outcomes, saving parties the time and
expense of arbitration. However, in the context of disputes involving
governments, settlements raise threats to principles of good governance,
including government accountability, respect for the rule of law, transparency,
and respect for citizens’ rights and interests under domestic law and
international human rights norms.[2] When a settlement agreement also
includes the settlement of a counterclaim, the threats are exacerbated.
To date, although discussions of investment treaty and ISDS reform have
intensified and have effected change in certain areas, these issues regarding
settlements and counterclaims have received relatively little attention. Yet,
given the frequency of settlements, the apparent ascendency of counterclaims
and the policy issues both raise, any reform agenda must also cover these
topics. After highlighting some of the problematic aspects of settlements and
counterclaims, this note suggests some possible ways forward.

1. Settlements by government respondents:
Implications for good governance
In ISDS disputes, respondent states are often represented by a particular
national agency that, depending on domestic law and institutions, may
exercise sole or significant control over litigation strategy, deciding which
arguments to advance or avoid, as well as whether and on what terms to settle.
This raises issues for the intra-governmental and intra-national distribution of
powers.
Assume, for example, that the agency handling a dispute is also responsible for
negotiating investment treaties and handling other issues relating to crossborder economic and political activities, and that the conduct challenged by
the investor is failure by environmental officials to authorize a proposed
project. The government body defending the case may have the power to settle
the dispute by agreeing to waive environmental requirements irrespective of
environmental officials’ legitimate concerns.[3]
A wide range of similar situations could arise in which the settling entity
adopted positions contrary to the prerogatives of other national agencies, the
intent of legislatures, or the rights of subnational governments.
Relatedly, a settling agency could undermine the rights of constituents. A
settlement might authorize a mining project resisted by local communities;

offer a tax exemption depleting funds available for social services; approve
electricity tariffs out-of-reach for consumers; guarantee privileged access to
water, land, or other natural resources over competing claims;[4] or include
any number of other commitments to act or not act, or pay or forego damages.
As has been recognized by courts and commentators in the context of
domestic litigation, giving the government such broad powers to unilaterally
determine what arguments to make and what settlements to adopt can
significantly—and negatively—impact the rights and interests of non-parties to
the litigation.[5] As one academic has noted, “consent of the Government” is
not the same as “consent of the governed.”[6]
Emphasizing these issues, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, a business
organization, has highlighted a “sue and settle” problem that arises when
government agencies settle, rather than defend, lawsuits by private parties. By
entering into settlements, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce states, a
government agency commits itself to “legally binding, court-approved
settlements negotiated behind closed doors, with no participation by other
affected parties or the public,” which allows agencies to avoid the legislatively
established norms governing the rulemaking process, frustrating the
separation of powers and distorting the priorities and duties of the agency in
favor of private outside groups.[7]
These concerns are even more valid in the context of ISDS.

2. Protections for the public interest: Domestic law vs.
investment law
Various rules and mechanisms exist in some domestic contexts for public and
judicial oversight of settlement agreements. These include:
Statutory requirements that apply prior to the formation of a settlement
agreement, such as rules requiring the government to give the public
notice of and an opportunity to comment on proposed agreements[5]
 Rules permitting or giving non-parties the right to intervene in disputes
and comment on or object to settlements[8]
 Requirements for judicial approval of certain proposed agreements[9]
 Doctrines preventing enforcement of settlement agreements that violate
the law.[10]
ISDS provisions and arbitral rules, however, provide no similar rules aimed at
protecting non-party rights and interests, or mechanisms for ensuring public
oversight of proposed settlement agreements.


For one, with the exception of a recent agreement concluded by the European
Union,[11] there is no express requirement in treaties or arbitral rules that a
settlement agreement concluded between the disputing parties and not
submitted to the tribunal be made public. If submitted to the tribunal and
entered as an order or award, the agreement may come to light, but may do so
too late for any response. A growing number of treaties and the Rules on
Transparency of the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) require transparency of awards, among other documents related
to an arbitration. Even so, there are no precise rules regarding timeliness of
such disclosures, and no requirement that, even if a settlement agreement
were transmitted to a tribunal, it would be made public before being given the
tribunal’s powerful stamp of approval.
Moreover, investment treaties and the arbitral rules they apply contain no
provisions enabling non-parties to join ongoing litigation and weigh in on or
challenge proposed settlements. The most non-parties can do is seek to
provide input as an amicus curiae, with no guarantee that their voices will be
taken into account. And, while doctrines such as the Monetary Gold principle
may safeguard the rights of non-parties by requiring dismissal of cases whose
resolution will affect non-parties’ interests, tribunals have tended to apply this
doctrine narrowly, if at all. This is particularly concerning because, as one
recent study found, settlements are more likely when private and state parties
wish to hide procedural and substantive outcomes from other
stakeholders.[12]
Finally, given the international law nature of ISDS cases, the settling agency
may be able to successfully assert that the primacy of international law over
domestic law justifies, if not mandates, enforcement of any ISDS settlement.
Even if the settlement agreement were clearly unlawful under the respondent
state’s law, it might be difficult for the state (or constituents within the state)
to prevent its enforcement. Assume stakeholders in a state successfully
challenged the validity of a settlement agreement in domestic courts. If the
government subsequently refused to abide by the settlement agreement, the
investor could challenge the government’s breach in ISDS and may succeed, as
tribunals have enforced contractual commitments made by governments even
where those commitments have doubtful legality under applicable domestic
law.[13]
A settlement agreement would be even further immunized from challenge if it
were entered as an award, even though questions may arise regarding
enforcement of non-pecuniary remedies. Under the Convention on the
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards (New York
Convention), the agreement could potentially be vacated at the seat of
arbitration, or refused enforcement on public policy grounds. However, these

recourse options may not preclude eventual enforcement.[14] Under the
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and
Nationals of Other States (ICSID Convention), the opportunity to resist
enforcement is even narrower.

3. Issues with settlements as part of counterclaims
These concerns over settlement may be magnified when the substantive
obligations that are the subject of a settlement agreement also involve
government counterclaims.
Many concerns relate to the overarching issue of whether and which claims
are or should be the government’s to bring and settle: Can a respondent state
settle claims relating to harms the investor caused to the state’s citizens? If so,
would the settlement preclude future actions against the investor by those who
were harmed? While some tribunals have declared that investors who are not
a party to a settlement agreement are not impacted by its terms, it is unclear
that the same rule would apply when judging the effects of an ISDS settlement
agreement reached by the state, given the state’s arguable power to represent
(and potentially dispose of claims by) its constituents.[15]
What is to prevent a state from using human rights or environmental claims of
harms to marginalized communities as bargaining chips? Are there any
reliable mechanisms to ensure that communities will receive any amounts
recovered from the investor? Similarly, are there checks to ensure that any
settlement reached by the state is adequate in light of the investor’s conduct
and the harm suffered by third parties? Any rules for avoiding collusion
between the investor and state to dispose of particular claims through an ISDS
settlement agreement?
When an ISDS settlement agreement improperly purports to limit or has the
effect of limiting the claims of non-parties, (how) does that affect the
settlement agreement’s validity and enforceability? Could a settlement be
vacated by non-parties to the agreement on these grounds? Would non-parties
have standing to raise a “public policy” exception to enforcement? Similarly, if
the investor, the state or both breached settlement obligations benefitting
non-parties, would those non-parties be able to seek enforcement?
These questions do not have easy answers, and it is outside the scope of this
note to explore them—and the many similar questions that may arise—in
detail. Even so, they are important to raise in order to highlight the reality that
counterclaims might benefit the settling state, but may not benefit, and may in
fact harm, the rights and interests of stakeholders within that state.

Procedural and substantive mechanisms at the national and international law
levels are needed to avoid those intra-national harms.

4. Proposals relating to the settlement of investment
disputes
To the extent ISDS continues to be included in investment treaties, states may
consider adopting measures to identify and address the threats to good
governance raised by settlements and counterclaims. Options could include:




At the domestic level, as a critical first step, states could implement
domestic rules and practices related to their ability to settle ISDS
disputes. These laws could address who has authority to settle and what
process must be followed, provide for appropriate transparency and a
meaningful opportunity to comment on proposed settlements, and
require settlement agreements to specify that they are void or invalid to
the extent they are inconsistent with domestic law and applicable
international law norms, including on human rights, environmental
protection and other areas.
At the international level:
 States could ensure that treaties and arbitral rules clearly require
transparency of settlement agreements entered into by the
government, including those agreements not entered as awards or
orders.
 Treaties could specify that the validity of any settlement agreement is
subject to compliance with procedural and substantive requirements
of domestic law, international human rights norms and other areas of
international law, as appropriate.
 Irrespective of whether such language is present in the treaty,
arbitrators should decline to enter settlement agreements that are
illegal under domestic law (for example, for lack of authority to
conclude the agreement) as orders or awards, and investors should
not be permitted to rely on fair and equitable treatment (FET) or
expropriation obligations to enforce illegal agreements or secure
compensation for their breach.
 Arbitrators should refrain from entering settlement agreements as
awards if they do not meet appropriate criteria, including that the
settlement be lawful and free from improper collusion or corruption,
and not purport to waive or affect the rights of non-parties.
 States party to the New York Convention could consider agreeing to
an interpretive instrument clarifying that the “public policy”

exception is meant to preclude enforcement of settlement agreements
that are invalid or ultra vires under the law of the host state,
international human rights law or other areas of international law.
Those party to the ICSID Convention could clarify that it would be a
“manifest excess of powers” for the tribunal to purport to enter such a
settlement agreement as an award.
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